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REGIONAL TRADE ARRANGEMENTS IN
THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Dr. Richard Bernal*

INTRODUCTION
As the demise of the cold war is blurring the divisions between East
and West, the new world order is realigning itself largely according to
economic poles. While the European Community was undergoing consolidation and Japan was emerging as an economic superpower, Canada,
the United States, and Mexico were negotiating the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Just as changing economic forces on
other continents led inevitably to NAFTA, so too will NAFTA shape
and be shaped by changing conditions throughout the entire Western
Hemisphere. Specifically, NAFTA may signal the birth of a free trade
zone extending from Alaska to Argentina.
Free trade areas and economic integration are not new ideas within
the Western Hemisphere. In fact, the countries of South America, Central America, and the Caribbean have frequently cooperated in free trade
arrangements since before World War H. For as many years, a myriad
political, economic, and ideological differences have prevented the Latin
American region from fully inserting itself into the world economy.
Although the debate over the impact and wisdom of NAFTA will continue, one thing is certain: NAFTA will influence and be influenced by
its relationships with its neighboring countries and trade regions within
the Western Hemisphere. Part I of this presentation provides an overview of Latin American regional integration schemes which emerged
after World War II, but which collapsed in disarray, were abandoned,
and never achieved the goals sought by their drafters. Part H then exam-
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ines the factors and influences accounting for the resurgence of regional
trade arrangements in the Western Hemisphere. Part II provides a survey of various initiatives and arrangements which have been put in
place or which are now being negotiated to promote trade within the
western hemisphere. Finally, Part IV discusses the fundamental issues
which must be addressed in order to stimulate trade and growth within
the hemisphere.
I. THE HISTORICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF REGIONAL
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Regional integration in Latin America was conceived of in the late
1930s, gathered momentum in the 1940s and 1950s, and witnessed its
first tangible manifestation in the early 1960s.' Throughout this period,
the nations of Latin America implemented a number of integration strategies which attained varying degrees of success Not long after the
countries of Latin America won their independence from the industrialized colonial powers, they began to examine various strategies of economic cooperation and integration.3 In 1939, Argentina and Brazil nego-

1. See DONALD W. BEARRESEN Er. AL, LATIN AMERICAN TRADE PATTERNS 34-36 (1965) [hereinafter LATIN AMERICAN TRADE PAT'TEPNS] (stating that
although Latin American countries were at first reluctant to experiment with economic
integration strategies in the years following World War HI, two important regional
trading groups eventually emerged: the Central American Common Market (CACNO,
and the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) which was formalized on
June 1, 1961).
2. See BELA BALASSA, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 2 (196?)
[hereinafter THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION] (discussing general concepts of
integration in the post World War II era). Balassa identifies four basic methods of
economic integration. Id First, in a "free trade area," tariffs are abandoned between
member countries but are enforced against outside nations. I, Second, as the
elimination of tariffs among member nations is perfected, there may be an accompanying equalization of tariffs against non member states. Id Third, an effective economic union will also seek to harmonize economic polices among its member states.
Id Finally, successful economic integration may lead to the creation of a
"supra-national authority" which acts as the preeminent decision-making body of the
trading group. Id See also ANDRE GUNDER FRANK, LATIN AMERICA: UNDERDEVELOPMENT OR REVOLUTION 175-77 (1969) (arguing that the creation of free trade zones in
Central America and South America will produce negative results such as siphoning
capital from the poor to the rich, and giving existing firms virtual monopoly power
within the trading blocs).
3.
See VICTOR L. URQUIDI, FREE TRADE AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN
LATIN AMERICA 20-21 (1962) (stating that prior to the outbreak of World War II, the
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tiated a treaty of "industrial complementation and free commerce."' In
early 1941, representatives of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay and
Uruguay attended a Regional Conference at which a number of economic agreements were signed in an effort to harmonize economic relations
among the countries! In particular, Argentina proposed the creation of a
"customs union" which would encompass the La Plata countries and
bordering nations.' These efforts toward Latin American integration
repeatedly ended in failure!
At the same time, on the other side of the Atlantic, the Netherlands,
Belgium, and Luxembourg formed a customs union in 1948 for trade in
industrial goods.' In 1952, the European Coal and Steel Community
emerged, followed by proposals for the economic unification of Europe? On March 25, 1957, the signing of the Treaty of Rome marked
the establishment of the European Economic Community. '
Although Europe moved persistently towards integration, the countries

countries of Latin America gathered at several Pan-American conferences to discuss
prospects for economic integration).
4. Raymond F. Mikesell, The Movement Toward Regional Trading Groups
in Latin America, in LATIN AMERICAN ISSUES: ESSAYS AND COMLNErs 125-26 (Albert 0. Hirschman ed., 1961) [hereinafter Mikesell].
5. LATIN AMICAN TRADE PATFERNS, supra note 1, at 33.
6. LATIN AMEICAN TRADE PATIERNS, supra note 1, at 33; Mikesell,
supra note 4, at 126. Customs unions, like free trade areas abolish tariffs among the
member nations. Report on the Liberalization of Inter-Latin American Trade, Economic Conference of the O.A.S., May 1957, Doe. 3, Agenda Item B, at 8 [hereinafter
Liberalization of Inter-Latin American Trade]. However, customs unions typically
require a greater degree of political integration which inevitably demands a relinquishment of a certain measure of national sovereignty. Id Free trade agreements,

however, involve a lesser degree of political and economic integration. Iu Thus, free
trade agreements are often seen as being more feasible than customs unions in Latin
America. Idu
7. See Mikesell, supra note 4, at 126 (noting that South American efforts
to integrate- failed to mature into any meaningful success). See also LATIN AMRiCAN
TRADE PATrERNS, supra note 1, at 33 (stating that the treaty born from the 1941
Regional Conference was never ratified due to opposition from the United States and
the United Kingdom). An additional treaty for the establishment of a customs union
between Colombia, Ecuador, Panama and Venezuela was also formalized in Quito in
1948 but never ratified. Mikesell, supra note 4, at 126.
8. See HmmAN VAN DER WEE, PROsPERrry AND UPHEAVAL: THE WoRLD
ECONOMY, 1945-1980 358-63 (1987) (providing an historical analysis of the first
European attempts at trade integration following World War II).
9. Id.
10. rd at 362.
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of Latin America continued to struggle for greater economic cooperation.
In the early 1950s, El Salvador negotiated bilateral free trade agreements
with four neighboring countries: Nicaragua and Guatemala in 1951,
Costa Rica in 1953, and Honduras in 1954." These agreements failed
to provide a significant impetus for greater trade, however, because they
only encompassed a limited number of commodities." Fortunately, the
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) continued to sponsor numerous studies of trade activity among Latin American countries which provided invaluable information for future integration efforts."
Although regional trade was slow to develop in Central and South
America, World War II and its aftermath generated increased demand
from the United States and Western Europe for Latin American
goods.14 By the mid-1950s, the volume of intra-Latin American trade
was substantially higher than it was before World War II, but it grew at
a slower rate than total world trade. 5 Between 1948 and 1955, the dollar value of total world exports rose by approximately 51%,6 while
Latin American exports to countries within the region increased by only
17%." Excluding increases in Venezuelan petroleum exports, the rise in
the dollar value of Latin American exports between 1948 and 1955 was
only 7% and in real terms the region experienced virtually no increase
in the volume of intra-Latin American trade during this period.' Between 1950 and 1955, trade liberalization efforts produced a 48% increase in intra-European trade." During that time, the combined trade
between the OEEC countries and rest of the world increased by 36%.2

11.
Mikesell, supra note 4, at 128.
12. Mikesell, supra note 4, at 128.
13. Mikesell, supra note 4, at 127. See generally URQUIDI, supra note 3
(discussing many studies conducted by ECLA and the information gathered regarding
Latin American trade).
14.
See LATIN AMEICAN TRADE PATrERNs, supra note 1, at 28-29 (stating
that World War II gave rise to, not only greater demand for Latin American food
products, but also allowed countries of the region to accumulate enormous stockpiles
of gold and foreign currency).
15. LATIN AMERICAN TRADE PATrERNS, supra note 1, at 75.
16. LATIN AMERICAN TRADE PATTERNS, supra note 1, at 74.
17. LATIN AMERICAN TRADE PATYERNs, supra note 1, at 75.
18. Liberalization of Inter-Latin American Trade, supra, note 6, at 8.
19. Liberalization of Inter-Latin American Trade, supra, note 6, at 8.
20. Liberalization of Inter-Latin American Trade, supra, note 6, at 18.
21.
Liberalization of Inter-Latin American Trade, supra, note 6, at 18.
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Forecasts or projections for the growth of Latin American exports'
were pessimistic," serving to redirect attention to the potential of
intra-Latin American trade.
In light of the slow growth of regional trade, compared to trade between the region and the rest of the world coupled with the apparent
success of trade liberalization in Europe, efforts to create a regional
common market attracted considerable attention in Latin America.'
Within and outside the region, many viewed economic integration as a
possible solution to the economic difficulties which the Latin American
nations were experiencing at that time." The formation of the European
Common Market (ECM) generated concern about the possibility of
losing markets to African producers of various staple goods. A regional
economic organization was considered an appropriate response to stem
this loss2
Latin America's worry about trade with Europe appeared well founded
as the value of exports to Western Europe in 1959 remained virtually
the same as in 1948. ' Exports to Western Europe, as a share of total
exports, declined from 49.8% in 1938, to 28.6% in 1958.' Thus, the
growing frustration experienced by developing countries in exporting to
the markets of industrialized countries provided a stimulus for regional
integration in Latin America and Africa.?
22.
U.N. ECONOMIC COMN'N FOR LATIN AMERICA, THE LATIN AIMRICAN
CoMMON MARKET at 57-58, U.N. Sales No. 59.ILG.4 (1959).
23.
See Louis 0. DELWART, THE FUTURE OF LATIN AMERICAN EXPORTS
TO THE UNITED STATES: 1965 AND 1970 10 (1960) (projecting that in the early
1960s Latin American exports to the United States were to increae approximately I
percent each year).
24. See URQUIDI, supra note 3, at 52 (stating that these developments exerted "considerable influence" on Latin America).
25. See LATIN AmERICAN TRADE PATrERNS, supra note 1, at 34 (stating
that, "The apparent success of the European Common Market and the widespread
publicity attached to it was heeded in Latin America. Economic integration through
combining country markets into larger, regional markets became the new nostrum for
Latin America's economic ills.").
26. See Mikesell, supra note 4, at 129 (stating that Latin American nations
were particularly concerned with losing markets to African suppliez of coffee, cocoa,
and bananas).
27. LATIN AERI CAN TRADE PATTERNS, supra note 1, at 75. From 1938 to
1948, Latin American exports to Western Europe jumped in value ftom $925 million
to $2.43 billion. Id However, ten years later in 1959, that value had increased to
only $2.44 billion. Id
28. LATIN AMERICAN TRADE PATTERNS, supra note 1, at 76.
29.
See SIDNEY DELi, TRADE BLocs AND COMMON MARKErS 160-62
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In 1959, the Working Group on the Latin American Regional Market
produced a report entitled "Recommendations Concerning the Structure
and Basic Principles of the Latin American Common Market."''" Also in
1959, at a conference in Montevideo, representatives of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and observers from Mexico and Venezuela, drafted the basic provisions of the Treaty of Montevideo." In February 1960, the Treaty of Montevideo was signed, creating a free trade area called the Latin American Free Trade Association
(LAFTA), encompassing Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay? The Central American Common Market
(CACM) came into existence in 1960 with member states, Costa Rica,
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and "Nicaragua.' In 1969, the Caribbean Free Trade Area (CARIFTA) was also established.'
Trade within these regional integration arrangements experienced
growth during the 1960s as it added renewed momentum to import
substitution industrialization. However, the expansion of intra-regional
trade stalled during the 1970s and contracted sharply during the 1980s.
Intra-regional trade peaked at 26% of total trade in the CACM in 1970,
14% in LAFTA in 1975-1980, and 4.8% in the Andean Common Market in 1988." During the 1980s, regional integration schemes and regional trade agreements either ceased to exist or survived in name only,
rather than in reality.' The contraction of trade and the disintegration
(1963) (discussing the motivations for Latin American nations to create their own
trading blocs, including the belief that the ECM was an intentional attack on the
economic health of undeveloped nations).
30. URQUIDI, supra note 3, at 56-57. This report produced a number of recommendations for the creation of a regional common market. Id at 57. These included opening up membership to all Latin American countries; including all goods produced in Latin America within the market; providing special tariff advantages to underdeveloped nations; facilitating competition within the market and avoiding monopolistic practices; and promoting the participation of private enterprise. IA
31.
See URQUIDI, supra note 3, at 59-64 (discussing the formulation of the
basic principles of the Latin American Common Market). See also Mikesell, supra
note 4, at 130 (discussing the formation, of the Montevideo Treaty).
32. URQUIDI, supra note 3, at 64. For a discussion of the provisions of the
Montevideo Treaty, see URQUiDI, supra note 3, at 73-78.
33.

GILBERT P. VERBIT, TRADE AGREEMENTS FOR DEvELOPING COUNTRIES

21-22 (1969).
34.
ld.at 5 n.11.

35.

Sylvia Saborio, The Long and Winding Road from Anchorage to

Patagonia, in THE PREMISE AND THE PROMISE: FREE TRADE IN THE AMERIcAS 16
(Sylvia Saborio et al. eds., 1992).
36.
See id.at 16-17 (citing protectionist motives and inefficient means of
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of regional arrangements was due to the following factors: (1) weakness
in the agreements which led to the polarization of benefits, inadequate
payment systems and a lack of policy coordination; (2) insufficient
political will to relinquish some measure of economic sovereignty and
overcome petty nationalistic disagreements; (3) policy disparities resulting from widely different ideologies and economic development strategies; (4) internal political crises, including civil wars, and coups; (5) the
adverse impact of external shocks such as inflated oil prices and declining commodity prices; (6) mismanagement of macroeconomic policy
contributing to inflation and debt; (7) implementation of regulatory polidies including protectionism and exchange controls; (8) exchange rate
volatility; and (9) the contraction of import demand as a result of structural adjustment and debt.
I.

THE RESURGENCE OF REGIONAL TRADE
ARRANGEMENTS

In recent years, the Caribbean and Latin America have witnessed a
resurgence of interest in regional trade liberalization, regional integration,
and economic cooperation. This momentum actually preceded the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI) which is dedicated to expanding
trade in the western hemisphere? The EAI did not initiate these developments, but, instead, complemented them and may have catalyzed
the processes of trade liberalization within the region." Several developments, discussed below, have influenced this resurgence of interest in
regional trade arrangements and regional integration.

A. TRADE BLOCS AS A TRANSITION TO GLOBALIZATION
Progressive globalization of production and finance is rapidly sweeping away national barriers to the movement of goods, services, capital,
import-substitution as causes of the decline of Latin American regional trade arrange-

ments).
37. Id.
38.
U.S. Signs Trade-Investment Pact HWth the Four MERCOSUR Nations;
Southern Cone Common Market Nations: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay,
Business America, Information Access Co., July 1, 1991, available in LEXIS, World
library, AIIWId file. President Bush announced the formation of the Enterprise for the
Americas Initiative on June 27, 1990. Id.

39. See Free Trade Areas, the Enterprisefor the Americas Initiative and
the Multilateral Trading System, in STRATEGIC OPTIONS FOR LAIiN AMEmICA IN ThE
1990s 259 (1991).
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and finance. ' This trend is evident in the fact that, in recent years,
international trade has grown at a faster rate than world Gross Domestic
Product (GDP)."' The speed and extent of these flows throughout the
global economy require a degree of freedom which will not be available
if countries maintain national barriers. International trade is the fundamental economic impetus behind the dismantling of national barriers
such as tariffs, quotas, and exchange controls as well as the formation
of regional associations within which there is a common market for
capital and goods. The institutional dimension of this global corporate
integration arises through mergers, which transnationalize ownership and
require multi-country market integration.'2 Global corporate integration
is one of the driving forces of regional economic integration because it
is a step towards minimizing the differences resulting from national
variations in monetary policy, taxation, and regulatory regimes."'
1. Trade Blocs
The transition to a world market is taking place as national economies
merge and amalgamate into trade blocs. The deepening of the integration

40.

See RICHARD O'BRIEN, GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRATION: THE END OF

GEOGRAPHY 83-86 (1992) (arguing that financial, economic, and monetary integration
will blur, if not do away with, many of the indigenous differences between various
nations).
41. See Record Exports of $39.2 Billion Narrows Trade Deficit to $7 Billion, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 51, at 2167 (Dec. 23, 1992) (noting that hopes for
economic recovery resulting from recent improvements in the U.S. trade deficit must
be qualified by the reality of moderate growth in the nation's gross domestic product); Enrique V. Iglesias, The New Latin America and the Inter-American Development Bank, WASH. Q., Winter 1993, at 115, 117 (stating that world trade in recent
years is expanding at a faster rate than production).
42.
SEE FOREIGN DIRECT INvEsT
:..rT
TRENDS AND POLICs, OROANIZA7TION
FOR ECONOMIC Co-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, JUNE 1992, AVAILABLE IN LEXIS,
WORLD LIBRARY, ALLWLD FILE (STATING THAT CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS MAY BE EMPLOYED AS A "RAPID MEANS OF ENTRY" INTO CERTAIN MARKETS).
INTERNATIONAL MERGER AND ACQUISITION ACTIVITY TARGETING WESTERN EUROPE
ROSE FROM $9 BILLION IN 1986, TO $52 BILLION IN 1989. AUGUSTo DE LA TORRE &
MARGARET R. KELLEY, REGIONAL TRADE ARRANGEIEmNr , IMF OCCASIONAL PAPER,

Mar. 1992, at 24. Merger activity targeting North America increased from $29 billion
in 1986 to $68 billion in 1988. 1,d
43. See Adoption of NAFTA Said to Lead to Common Market in Western
Hemisphere, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 313-14 (Feb. 24, 1993) (reporting that
it is believed that, in the future, corporations will be identified, not by their country
of origin, but by their trade bloc of origin).
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process in the European Economic Community (EEC) and the conclusion of the North American Free Trade Agreement are manifestations of
a trend toward the emergence of trade blocs. This trend could lead to a
compartmentalized global economy" consisting of: a European Economic Space (EES) made up of the EEC, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and Eastern Europe; a Western Hemisphere Free Trade
Area (WHFA) including Canada, the United States, and Mexico; and a
free trade arrangement linking the countries of South East Asia and
Japan. The EEC is a large and important market for the United
States. After 1992, however, it will be more difficult for United States
exporters to penetrate the European market. The North American Free
Trade Area, if it comes to fruition, will include Mexico, Canada and the
United States and will create a market of 360 million people,' compared to 300 million in the EEC.4 ' A hemispheric free trade area is envisioned by the EAI countries which would have a market of 719 million people with a combined GDP of $6.8 trillion. "' Japan and the new-

44. SEE LEsT THUROW, HEAD TO HEAD: TIE COMING OF TM ECONO.C
BAT=LE AMONG JAPAN, EUROPE AND AMERiCA 14-17 (1992) (analyzing the prospects
of a new world order dominated by regional economic blocs with Japan, Europe and
the United States acting as the focal points of power). See also, C. Fred Bergsten,
The World Economy After the Cold War, FOREIGN AFF., Summer 1990, at 96, 96
[hereinafter The World Economy After the Cold War] (asserting that the post-cold war
world order will revolve around an economic "tripolarity" dominated by Europe, the
United States, Japan, and the trading blocs into which they may evolve).
45. SEE LiM SIONG HOON & KUALA LUMPuR, AsEai TAES FIRST SmiP To
REGIONAL CUSTOMS GROUPING, FIN. TEs, Oct 9, 1991, at 3 (reporting that in October 1992, the member countries of the Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN) announced their creation of an Asian Free Trade Area (AFTA), consisting
of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, with the
objective of creating a single market within 15 years. Id An East Asian Economic
Group consisting of Japan, the Asian countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
South Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan would encompass 33.8 percent of the exports
of these countries. See also Edward Balls, Building Trade Blocs in East Asia and the
Pacific, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1992, at 4 (reporting that the proposed merger of EFTA
and the ECC has prompted Asian countries to form the Association of South-East
Asian Nations).
46. Latin America: Regional Integration Unlikely, Says Minwer, Inter Press
Service, Feb. 2, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, AllWld File.
47. See New European Trade Zone In Effect in July, Xinhua News Agency,
Jan. 22, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, AIIWId File (predicting that the
merger of the ECC and EFTA would boast a combined population of 380 million
people).
48. See U.S. Signs Trade-Investment Pact ith the Four MERCOSUR Na-
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ly industrialized countries of East Asia have a combined GDP of $3.2
trillion, and a population of 199 million people."9
The need for a response to the formation of trade blocs in a
"regionalized" world economy provided a strong impetus to the new
wave of regional integration." Regional integration is viewed as a potent response because of the strengthening of bargaining power and the
coordination of external policies."1 Thus, some have argued that the
changing international climate compels Latin American countries to
coordinate their trade efforts. 2

2. The Uruguay Round of the GATT
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATI) continues to be
the main vehicle for advancing and promoting international trade liberalization. 3 The Uruguay Round of the GATT, which seeks to further
liberalize trade and investment, is a natural extension of globalization.'
tions; Southern Cone Common Market Nations: Argentina, Brazi4 Paraguay and Uruguay, Business America, Information Access Company, July 1, 1991, available in
LEXIS, World Library, AIlWId File (reporting on the signing and proposed signing of
various bilateral framework agreements dedicated to the creation of a hemispheric
trade zone).
49. EDWARD BALLS, BuILDING TRADE BLocs IN EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC,
FIN. TIMEs, Feb. 3, 1992, at 4.
50. MoNIcA HiRST, MERCOSUR AND THE NEw CIRCUMSTANCES FOR f"7
ITEGRA47ON, 46 CEPAL REV., Apr. 1992, at 147, 147.
51.
SEE Sou'RHEAsT AsIA: PREPARING FOR A NEw WoRLD ORDER, WASH. Q.,
Winter 1993, at 187, 193 (reporting that efforts in Asia to increase trade cooperation
are viewed as a defensive response to European and North American regional integration arrangements).
52. See Putting the Uruguay Round in First Place; Ditchley Conference
Draws Several Distinctions, Latin America Weekly Report, March 11, 1993, available
in LEXIS, World Library, AlIWld File (asserting that the level of trade among the
nations of the Western Hemisphere is insufficient to make NAFTA an effective weapon against European protectionist policies). See also Carlos Massad, A New Integration Strategy, CEPAL Rev., Apr. 1989, at 91, 101 (stating that "Latin America, with
a population of some 400 million inhabitants, will be unable, disunited, to face up to
next century's super-blocs. If it tries to do so, it runs the risk of being, at least commercially and culturally, absorbed.").
53. The World Economy After the Cold War, supra note 44, at 110 (arguing that a successful completion of the Uruguay Round of GATr would significantly
facilitate the liberalization of world trade "by expanding international disciplines on
agriculture and safeguard measures, broadening the rules to encompass services and
intellectual property rights, reintegrating textile into the GATT, and improving the process for settling disputes.").
54.
See The World Economy After the Cold War, supra note 44, at 109-10
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In this scenario, the GATT would be the institutional and regulatory
framework for global trade liberalization. However, the decline of United
States hegemony has led to difficulties in completing the Uruguay
Round negotiations.O Ultimately, the Uruguay Round could end in disarray or fail to resolve key issues of the agenda. There is a growing apprehension that if there is a collapse or only partial resolution of GATIT,
it would cause an escalation in protectionism.' The disintegration of

the GAIT negotiations could provoke a proliferation of bilateral trade
agreements and intensify the incentive to form various regional trade arrangementsP which may, by virtue of a common external tariff, raise
protectionist barriers to exports from other groups and countries.
B. INCREASING INTERDEPENDENCE IN THE WESTERN HEIUSPHERE
Interdependence within the western hemisphere has increased. In 1988,
the value of trade between North and South America was nearly $85
billion, three% of world tradess Between 1970 and 1988, total
intra-American trade increased seven-fold to over $249 billion' For
other countries in the hemisphere, almost one half of their exports go to

(discussing ways to prevent a new world order, composed of three large trading blocs
in Europe, North America, and Southeast Asia, from becoming confrontational and
retaliatory).
55. See The World Economy After the Cold War, supra note 44, at 96-97
(arguing that, although the collapse of the Soviet Union may have left the United
States as the single remaining military power, this position may now be of marginal
utility as international relationships become increasingly defined by economic strength).
56. See The World Economy After the Cold War, supra note 44, at 110
(citing the successful completion of the Uruguay Round of GAIT as a critical step in
preventing the development of economic conflict in the new economic world order).
57. Cf The World Economy After the Cold War, supra note 44, at 108
(stating that if Europe is unwilling to negotiate broad global trade reforms, the United
States and Japan might enter into bilateral agreements, without Europe's participation);
Putting the Uruguay Round in First Place; Ditchley Conference Draws Several Dlstinctions, Latin America Weekly Report, March 11, 1993, available in LEXIS, World
Library, AIiWld File (stating that the failure of GAIT could lead to greater cooperation between the United States and Latin America). See also Augusto de Ia Torre &
Margaret R. Kelley, Regional Trade Arrangements, IMF Occasional Paper, Mar. 1992,
at 42 (stating that the failure of GAIT may force the United States to pursue bilateral and plurilateral arrangements with other nations).
58. REF ERZAN & AL.EXANDER YEATS, FREE TR4DE AGREEMEmFIs Wrm
THE UN/TED STATES, WORLD BANK WORKING PAPERS ON INT'L TRADE (VIPS 827)
Jan. 1992, at 4.

59.

Id. at 5. In 1970, total intra-America trade amounted to $36 billion. Id.
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the United States. Therefore, hemispheric interdependence has increased
tremendously. It is also interesting to note that the rate of growth of
United States exports to the hemisphere has far exceeded the growth of
those exports to the rest of the world.' Similarly, trade within the
hemisphere has grown much more rapidly for Latin American countries
than trade with the rest of the world.6
C.

ThE ROLE OF EcoNoMIc REFORM

The extent of the economic stagnation in Latin America and the Caribbean which has prevailed throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s, is
evident in the fact that GDP in real terms and GDP per capita are actually lower in 1990 than they were in 1977 for the region as a whole.'
Furthermore, the region has suffered a persistent de-capitalization
through capital flight and heavy debt servicing. In 1991, debt service
absorbed over 40% of export earnings and the debt-to-exports ratio was
significant at 287%.3 Latin America and the Caribbean have also suffered a negative net transfer of resources between 1980 and 1990, reaching a high of $31 billion in 1983." Compounding these problems is
rampant inflation, which in 1990 reached 7,000% in Peru and over
13,000% in Nicaragua.'
Against this background, the severe economic crisis of Latin America
and the Caribbean during the 1980s compelled a re-examination of economic policy. The region responded to the economic stagnation with a
reorientation of economic policies to focus on economic reform, stabilization, and structural adjustment in an attempt to initiate a
private-sector, market-driven, outward-looking growth strategy.' Import
60. See Department of Commerce Market Report on the Western Hemisphere: The Enterprise for the Americas, National Trade Data Bank, Jan. 15, 1993,
available in LEXIS, World Library, AIIWId File (reporting that United States exports
to 30 Latin American and Caribbean countries increased by 18 percent between 1984
and 1991, three times faster than the United States exports to the rest of the world).
61. Id.
62. Preliminary Overview of the Economy of Latin America and the Caribbean, U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America, at 3, U.N. Doc. LC/01696
(1991).
63. Id. at 53-54.
64. Id at 51.
65. Id at 40.
66. See Enrique V. Iglesias, The New Latin America and the Inter-American
Development Bank, Wash. Q., Winter 1993, at 115, 116 (reporting that recent Latin
American economic reforms and structural adjustment measures which have opened
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substitution and state-led development strategies have been renounced
and dismantled in favor of outward-oriented approaches." Most Latin
American countries, as well as many Central American and Caribbean
countries have reduced tariffs, removed quantitative trade restrictions and
vigorously implemented programs of privatization. ' A change in Latin
American integration strategy from an inward-oriented approach aimed at
strengthening stalled import-substitution industrialization, to an
outward-oriented approach complementing internal market liberalization
has also taken place.' Regional trade liberalization was a logical outgrowth of market-oriented policies because it sought to enlarge the marklt.
D.

MULTILATERALISM AND REGIONALISM IN UNITED STATES
TRADE POLICY

The attitude of the United States government towards regional trade

arrangements and regional integration has varied with the nation's perception of its national interests. The United States has supported regional
integration when it regarded a region as being in need of economic
development for purposes of safeguarding against external threats, or internal de-stabilization. On the other hand, the United States has vehemently opposed regional economic arrangements when such action is
perceived as excluding or diminishing United States exports, or making

Latin American economies and deregulated domestic markets are attracting more capital and expanding exports). See also, Adoption of NAFTA Said to Lead to Common
Market in Western Hemisphere, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 313-14 (Feb. 24,
1993) (stating that growth in Latin American countries will require increased trade
and a recalibration of domestic policies); Sylvia Saborio, The Long and Wlinding Road
from Anchorage to Patagonia, in THE PREMisE AND THE PRomSE: FREE TRADE IN
THE AMERICAS 16-17 (Sylvia Saborio et al. eds., 1992) (describing Latin American
economic reforms of the 1980s which rely on market forces).
67.

-

Ia

68. Id. See Canada: Lingering Bilateral Trade Disputes Need to Be Resolved, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 152-53 (Jan. 27, 1993) (reporting that the
reduction of Latin American trade barriers is a critical step towards regional integration). The Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM) recently voted to reduce their
external tariff from 45 percent to a flexible range of 5 to 20 percent by 1998. Id
69. See Adoption of NAFTA Said to Lead to Common Afarket in Western
Hemisphere, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 8, 313-14 (Feb. 24, 1993) (reporting that a
World Bank official warns that the investment and privatization programs implemented
by Latin American countries may actually retard growth if the benefits are not felt by
the average citizens of each country).
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market access more difficult through protectionism.
Proposals prior to 1945 for the creation of a European union were
considered to be harmful to United States interests and viewed with
suspicion."' In the aftermath of World War II, however, the United
States vigorously supported Western European economic cooperation and
integration for a combination of economic, political, strategic, and security reasons." The establishment of the EEC and the economic recovery
of its member states transformed the character of European-United States
economic relations from dependence to interdependence. By the early
1970s, the United States viewed the EEC as an increasingly exclusionary
trading group.73
This experience with the EEC may explain why United States support
for Latin American regional integration in the 1950s was less than enthusiastic. 7' This support was conditioned largely by the fear of
private-sector interests that expansion of intra-regional trade would be
harmful to United States exports." The early 1960s, however, saw an
increasing willingness to concede that regional economic integration in
Latin America did not embrace protectionism to the detriment of United

70. BELA BALASSA, TRADE LiBERALIZATiON AMONG INDUSTRIAL COUNOBJECIVES AND ALTERNATIVES 23 (1967). Balassa also notes that during
War II, the United States' vision of a new world order dominated by the
States and the Soviet Union did not contemplate the existence of regional
blocs. 1d
71.
1d at 23-25.
72. See Lawrence B. Krause, European Economic Integration and the United
States 222-25 (1968) (discussing the ways in which European integration has contributed to the "evaporation" of United States hegemony). This recalibration of influence is illustrated by an incident in 1962 when, as a reaction to the United States
refusal to respect a concession for imports of glass and carpet, the EEC retaliated
against American exports. Id. at 225.
73. See Text of Kissinger's Speech at African Pacific Meeting Here on U.S.
Relations with Europe, N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1973, at A15 (reporting that Kissinger
stated that the "prospects of a closed trading system embracing the European Community and a growing number of other nations in Europe, the Mediterranean, and
Africa, appear to be at the expense of the United States and other nations which are
excluded. In agriculture, where the United States has a comparative advantage, we are
particularly concerned that Community protective policies may restrict access for our
products").
74. See Miguel S. Wionezek, The Montevideo Treaty and Latin American
Economic Integration, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Q. Rev., June 1961, at 223 (describing United States attitudes toward Latin American integration prior to the Kennedy administration as ambivalent).
75.
Id. at 225.
TRIES:
World
United
trading
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States exports, the multilateral trading system, or the principles of
GAIT.7 6
In the latter part of the 1980s, the United States became an advocate
of regional trade arrangements starting with the United States-Canada
Free Trade Agreement.L In 1990, NAFTA was proposed with the anticipation that it would eventually evolve into a western hemisphere free
trade area? 8 This policy reflects the importance the United States places
on markets in the hemisphere at a time when its own economy is suf-

fering from large persistent trade deficits, and when economic growth
has become more dependent on exports" The push to conclude
NAFTA also coincides with the consolidation of the European Commu-

nity, the uncertainty about concluding the Uruguay Round of the GAIT,
and the frustration over access to the Japanese market.'
The United States has traditionally advocated and used its influence to
promote free-trade in the multilateral trading systems. Since the
mid-1970s, however, there has been an increasing propensity to "manage" trade by resorting to protectionism for selected endangered industries." The justifications often put forth for implementing protectionist

76. Id.at 230-32.
77. Foreign Direct Investment: Trends and Policies, OECD Observer, June
1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, AIIWId File.
78. See US. Signs Trade-Investment Pact With the Four MERCOSUR Nations; Southern Cone Common Market Nations: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, Business America, Information Access Company, July 1, 1991, available in
LEXIS, World Library, AIlWld File (reporting on President Bush's praise of the signing of recent framework agreements which are bilateral trade agreements created to
complement the efforts of the EAI in creating a free trade zone from Alaska to Argentina). Canada, Mexico, and the United States signed the North American Free
Trade Agreement on December 17, 1992. Jonathan Confino, Canada, Mexico and US
Form $4 Trillion Trade Bloc, Daily Tele., Dec. 16, 1992, at 16, 16.
79. See Record Erpors of $39.2 Billion Narrows Trade Deficit to $7 Billion, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 51, at 2167 (Dec. 23, 1992) (discussing the relationship between the United States trade deficit, exports, and growth).
80. C. Michael Aho & Sylvia Ostry, Regional Trading Blocs: Pragmatic or
Problematic Policy, in The Global Economy: America's Role in the Decade Ahead
147-73 (William Brock & William Hormats, eds. 1990) (stating that a "weakened and
inadequate GAIT has both spawned the pursuit of alternatives to multilateralism and
has been further weakened by that pursuit").
81. See Jagdish Bhagwati, Aggressive Unilateralism: An Overview, in Aggressive Unilateralism 11-13 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh Patrick eds., 1992) (arguing
that the United States is suffering from "diminished giant syndrome" in which the
country's national perception of its relative decline as a world power has spawned an
increasing willingness to resort to protectionist policies). See also CLYDE V.
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policies include preventing the demise of strategic industries such as
iron and steel, preserving the level of wages from "cheap labor" imports, maintaining jobs, retaliating against external protectionist barriers,
and as a bargaining chip to secure market opening." There was a
growing recognition that strategic and selective application of protectionist policies promotes exports, reduces trade deficits, and retards
de-industrialization. Support for managed trade Was regarded not as
short-sighted protectionism, but rather as a practical, patriotic defense of
national interests.
Many who participated in the formulation of United States trade policy, including the then Secretary of the Treasury, James Baker, regarded
the employment of bilateral and regional trade agreements as a means of
increasing leverage in securing liberalization and expanded coverage in
the multilateral trade system.8 In testimony before the United States
Congress in 1988, Ambassador Clayton Yeutter, then United States
Trade Representative, stated unequivocally that the United States-Canada
Free Trade Agreement furnished
a bit of leverage here, in that it indicates to the rest of the world that we,
the United States, can make progress in opening borders and confronting
trade barriers, either bilaterally or multilaterally. Our preference is the
multilateral route, but if this route should prove fruitless, for one of a
variety of reasons, this certainly indicates that we can achieve success bilaterally and that we are prepared to pursue these basic objectives on a
bilateral basis, should that become essential.'
The growth of protectionist sentiment is linked to a growing recog-

How WE ALLOWED JAPAN TO TAKE TE LEAD
313 (1988) (stating that "[A]s the United States declines, it is increasingly faced with
PRESTOWriz, JR., TRADING PLACES:

the choice between maintaining its support of noninterventionist free trade policies and
of ensuring the continued health of important industries ....
[A]s Japan's success,
based on a very different economic doctrine, expands, the United States is increasingly driven to shield its industries for national security purposes, while accusing Japan
of being unfair.").

82.

See The World Economy After the Cold War, supra note 44, at 98-103

(discussing the potential for conflict among the "Big Three" trading blocs, Europe,
North America, and Southeast Asia).

83.

See James Baker, The Geographic Implications of the U.S.-Canada

Trade Pact, Int'l Econ., Jan.-Feb. 1988, at 34, 37.

84. Hearings on Oversight of the United States-Canada Free Trade
Agreement Before the Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade of
House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 98 (1988) (statement of Clayton Yeutter, United States Trade Representative).
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nition that free trade is an ideal which the world perceives to be desirable, but that is actually increasingly diverging from reality. The argument that free trade is the best option for the international economy is
based on the Ricardian-Hecksher-Ohlin theory of comparative advantage.' However, the validity of the theory increasingly came into question as the reality of real world trade progressively invalidated its assumptions.' There are also advocates of "aggressive bilateralism" who
justify the use of sanctions to lower or dismantle protectionist barriers
which hinder United States exports to several countries, most notably,
Japan.'
E.

INSERTION INTO THE WORLD ECONOMY

The need to change Latin America's "insertion" into the world
economy and, more specifically, its role in the international division of

labor is the dominant current in Latin American thought on development
economics. This is reflected in the work of Raul Prebisch,,' who in the
1950s, conceived of the "center-periphery" dichotomy, which became a
tenet of economic thought in the region, whether in a "structuralist"
framework,' a "dependency" orientation, ' or "Marxist imperialist"
85. See Charles P. Kindleberger & Peter H. Lindert, International Economics
16-23 (1978) (explaining the principle of comparative advantage).
86. See Giovanni Dosi, et al., Trade, Technologies, and Development: A
Frameworkfor Discussing Japan, in Politics and Productivity: The Real Story of Why
Japan Works 7 (Chalmers Johnson et al. eds., 1989) (stating: "(Wjith increasing returns and imperfect competition, free trade is not necessarily and automatically the
best policy. Trade without barriers and government policies of promotion that distort
markets may improve national welfare. However, government policy to strengthen the
competitive position of domestic producers in world markets may generate higher
levels of national welfare than would result from free trade.").
87. See Rudiger W. Dombuch, Policy Options for Freer Trade: The Case
for Bilateralism, in An American Trade Strategy: Options for the 1990s 112-13 (Robert Lawrence & Charles Schultze, eds., 1990) (arguing that "trade policy" has unfairly
become equated with protectionism).
88. See Raul Prebisch, International Trade and Payments in an Era of
Coexistence: Commercial Policy in the Underdeveloped Countries, 49 Am. Econ. Rev.
251, 251 (1959) (explaining: "Historically, the spread of technical progress has been
uneven, and this has contributed to the division of the world economy into industrial
"centers" and "peripheral" developing nations engaged in primary production, with
consequent differences in income growth"). In the late 1950s, Raul Prebisch acted as
the Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin
America and led a working group dedicated to formulating a proposal for Latin
American integration. 1Mikesell, supra note 4, at 131.
89. See generally Celso Furtado, Development and Underdevelopment in
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paradigm. 1 The "metropolitan-hinterland" relationship'a of the so
called "Plantation School" of the English speaking Caribbean also focused on this issue.93 Today, the issue of insertion, its character, and
the necessity for change is still at the center of the economic debate.'
Regional integration is regarded as vital to the process of "seeking to
develop a new model of external insertion."'
F. THE SECURITY OF MARKET ACCESS
Maintaining security of access to the United States market for its
exports was one of the principal motives which compelled Canada to
negotiate a free trade agreement with the United States. Because the
United States accounted for almost 80% of its total exports,' Canada
was concerned about its vulnerability to United States trade policy. One
observer compared the potential for economic conflict among competing

Latin America (1961) (discussing the structuralist analysis of underdeveloped countries).
90. Theotonio dos Santos, The Structure of Dependence, 60 Am. Econ. Rev.
231 (1970); See also Osvaldo Sunkel, Transnational Capitalism and National Integration in Latin America, 22 Soc. & ECON. STUD. 132, 136 (1973) (explaining that the
world is polarized between the dominant developed "central northern" nations and the
dependent underdeveloped "peripheral southern" nations, as well as polarized within
countries between advanced and primitive groups).
91.
Edgardo Flota, The Centre-Periphery System and Unequal Exchange, 39
CEPAL Rev., Dec. 1989, at 135-54.
92. Lloyd Best, Outlines of a Model of Pure Plantation Economy, 17 Soo.
& Econ. Stud. 283 (1968); GEORGE BECKFORD, PERSISTENT POVERTY: UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN PLANTATION ECONOMIES OF THE THIRD WORLD 44-48 (1973). Under te

"plantation theory" of economic development, underdeveloped countries are viewed as
mere "plantations," producing a staple good for export to the "metropolis" or industrialized nations. Id
93.
See Norman Girvan, The Development of Dependency Economies In the
Caribbean and Latin America: Review and Comparison, 22 Sec. & Econ. Stud. 1
(1973) (surveying Latin American contributions to the economics of development
during the post-World War I era).
94. See Fernando Fajnzylber, Unavoidable Industrial Restructuring in Latin
America (1990) (examining the factors underlying Latin America's failure to achieve
sustainable growth and development).
95. Monica Hirst, MERCOSUR and the New Circumstancesfor Its Integration, CEPAL Rev., Apr. 1992, at 147.
96. See The World Economy After the Cold War, supra note 44, at 101
(noting the heavily reliance of Mexico and Canada on trade with the United States).
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trade blocs to dangers created by the alliances of 1914.' The need to
secure access to the United States market was also one of the motives
of Mexico in seeking a free trade agreement. Prompted by the experience of the 1980s, Mexico sought to guarantee market access and the
availability of a bilateral dispute resolution mechanism.'
III.

REGIONAL TRADE ARRANGEMENTS

The current dominant tendency in the western hemisphere is towards
liberalization of hemispheric trade through regional trade arrangements.
Three types of regional arrangements can be distinguished: (a) multilateral arrangements based on reciprocity; (b) multilateral arrangements
based on preferential arrangements; and (c) bilateral arrangements. The
following is a survey of currently existing agreements within each category, and agreements which are proposed or are forthcoming.

A. CURRENTLY EXISTING TRADE AGREEMENTS WITHIN THE
WESTERN HEMISPHERE

1. Multilateral Arrangements Based on Reciprocity
(i) Argentina and Brazil have sought to liberalize their trade periodically since the late 1930s. The most recent attempts between 1985 and
1988 resulted in the negotiation of twenty-four protocols.' The two
nations signed the Treaty on Integration and Cooperation in 1989. In
July 1990, they established the Buenos Aires Act, providing for the creation of a common market between them.'0 ' On March 26, 1991, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay signed the Treaty of Asuncion
which establishes a South American Quadripartite Common Market

97. The World Economy After the Cold War, supra note 44, at 97.
98. ALBERT FISHLOW & STEPHEN HAGGARD, THE UNrrED STATE AND THE
REGIONALISATION OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 27 (1992); Nora Lustig, Mexico Integration Strategy with North America, in STRATEGIC OPImONS FOR LAim AEmRICA 163

(Colin L Bradford eds., 1992) (describing a shift in the Mexican approach toward
NAFTA, away from a "plurilateral" approach in which the North American trade area
would seek to increase trade with the world at large, to a more bilateral approach
concentrating on the creation of a unified trading bloc that would provide leverage in
dealing with competing trade areas).

99.

Monica Hirst, MERCOSUR and the New Circumstancesfor its Integra-

tion, CEPAL Rev., Apr. 1992, at 147.

100.

Luigi Manzetti, Economic Integration in the Southern Cone, North-South

Focus, Dec. 1992, at 1, 1.
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(MERCOSUR) by December 1995.2"1 These countries have already reduced tariffs on trade among themselves and are discussing the establishment of a common external tariff." Trade within MERCOSUR has
grown 44%, from US$6 billion in 1988 to US$10.5 billion in 1991.3
The MERCOSUR countries account for an estimated 35% of intra-Latin
American trade."4 There are, however, potentially disruptive problems
arising from a divergence in macroeconomic policy, dramatic economic
trends, trade imbalances, and political shifts.'"
(ii) Work towards regional integration in Central America commenced
as early as 1951 and the Central American Common Market (CACM)
was established in 1960.'" By 1969, nearly all trade within the CACM
had been granted duty free status. However, the CACM declined during
the 1970s because of economic, political and ideological differences
among the governments, and today continues to face such problems."°
In 1992, the value of intra-regional exports was 40% below the 1980
level."° The resuscitation of intra-regional trade has been delayed by
the uneven pace of adjustment among the member countries. Sylvia
Sabario characterizes adjustment policy as a "minimalist approach" resulting in often erratic and poorly coordinated policy adjustments and
reversals."° In July 1991, the CACM countries agreed to re-establish
the common market. El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras have signed
an agreement to establish a free trade zone by January 1993.20
101.
Id.
Id. By 1994, it is expected that tariffs for Argentina and Brazil will be
102.
reduced to zero. Id. Uruguay and Paraguay are expected to achieve similar tariff
reductions by December 1995. Id.
103.
Id. at 3.
104. Id.
Id. at 3-4. See also John Barham, Trade Imbalance Strains MERCOSUR
105.
Pact, Fin. Times, Nov. 17, 1992, at 6 (reporting that in October 1992, Argentina
tripled its import tax to 10 percent and blames its $1A billion trade deficit on an
increase of cheaper Brazilian imports).
106. VERBIT, supra note 33, at 21-22.
107.
Jose Manual Salazar-Xirinachs, Policy Reform and Economic Integration
in Central America in the 1990s, in Study Papers on the Caribbean Basin: Economic
and Security Issues, presented by the Joint Economic Comm., Jan. 1993.

108.

Sylvia Saborio, U.S.-Central America Free Trade, in The Premise and

the Promise: Free Trade in the Americas 201 (Sylvia Saborio et al. eds., 1992).
Sylvia Saborio, Central America, in Latin American Adjustment 285
109.
(John Williamson ed., 1990).
110. Damian Fraser, Mexico Links With New Trade Zone: A Framework Pact
for Central America, Fin. Times, Aug. 26, 1992, at 5, 5.
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(iii) The Caribbean Community (CARICOM), which is a common
market between thirteen English-speaking Caribbean countries is noteworthy because it is the longest existing successful regional integration
agreement!" The CARICOM was established in 1973 as further integration of those economies which had previously comprised the Caribbean Free Trade Association which operated since 1968."' During the
1980s intra-regional trade declined sharply due to severe economic recession in several member countries, and the collapse of the regional
payments facility.113 However, in 1984, CARICOM members agreed to
establish a Common External Tariff (CET) which is now only partially
implemented. Because CARICOM failed for a third time to meet the
scheduled date in October 1991 for introducing a CET,"' a new deadline was set for 1993. A recent Report of the West Indian Commission
noted that the CET should be implemented to provide leverage in trade
negotiations between CARICOM and other trading blocs." However,
the report also cautioned that if CARICOM is to take advantage of the
new wave of global trade liberalization, it must be prepared to make
efforts toward tariff reductions."'
(iv) The Andean Common Market, established in 1969, includes as
members, Peru, Bolivia, Venezuela, Columbia and Ecuador."' It has
not functioned as well as expected partly because of the economic policies of member countries." 8 Since May 1991, the members have im-

111. See Time for Change: The Report of the West Indian Commission
(1992) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE WEST INDIAN COMMISSION] (providing a compre-

hensive report on the political, social, and economic progress of the CARICOM nations). The CARICOM nations consist. of Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitls and Nevis, St.
Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago. rd at xx.
112. W. ANDREW AXUNE, CARIBBEAN INTEGRATION: THE PoLmcs OF REGIONAIISM 83 (1979).
113. See Report of the West Indian Commission, supra note 111, at 145
(stating that intra-regional trade accounts for less than 10 percent of all trade from
the CARICOM nations).
114. See Report of the West Indian Commission, supra note 111, at 106-08
(discussing arguments for and against the implementation of the CET).
115.
116.

REPORT OF THE WEsr INDIAN COMMISSION, supra note 111, at 106.
REPORT OF THE WEST INDIAN COMMiuSSiON, supra note 111, at 107.

117. See Jeffrey J.Schott & Gary C. Hufbauer, Free Trade Areas, The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative and the Multilateral System, in Strategic Options
for Latin America in the 1990s 260 (Colin L Bradford eds., 1992).
118. Sarita Kendall, Andean Common Market Fails to Deliver, Fin. Times,
Feb. 13, 1992, at 7, 7.
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plemented a number of measures to eliminate restrictions and to standardize various regulations, including an effort to reduce external tariffs
to between 5% and 20%-"" Within the framework of the Andean
Group, Columbia and Venezuela signed a partial free trade agreement
covering 6,000 goods which came into effect on February 6, 1992.120
The group has pledged to establish a common agricultural policy and to
harmonize exchange and fiscal policies.'
(v) The Latin American Integration Association (LAIA) was formed
in 1980 to replace the Latin America Free Trade Association which had
been created in 1960.'" The membership of LAIA consists of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru,
Uruguay and Venezuela." Although this agreement includes the countries of South America it currently exists only on paper and has no time
24
limits '
(vi) An agreement between Mexico, Columbia and Venezuela became
effective in 1992. Mexico and Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador also
signed an agreement in August 1992 with the objective of establishing
free trade by the end of 1996.'" This agreement sets out the guidelines
for these countries in pursuing mutual trade agreements which are expected to eventually develop into a common free trade agreement.'26
2. Preferential Arrangements
The following agreements are based on preferential arrangements
granted by one country to another, or to a group of countries.
(i) The Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) is an agreement which provides one way free trade for 90% of the products from Central America
and the Caribbean entering the United States market.'" The drawback

119.
1d
120. Id.
121. Id.
122.
LAN Assesses the Woeful Lack of Regional Cooperation and Economic
Integration Among Latin American Countries Over the Past Twenty Years, Reuter
Latin America Weekly Report, available in LEXIS, World Library, AIlWId File.
123. Id
124.
Id.
125. Damian Fraser, Mexico Links With New Trade Zone: A Framework Pact
for Central America, Fin. Times, Aug. 26, 1992, at 5, 5.
126. Id.
Annual Report on the Impact of the Caribbean Basin Economic Recov127.
ery Act on U.S. Industries and Consumers, USITC Report to Congress and the Presl-
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with this arrangement is that many of the exports which have the best
prospects for Central America and the Caribbean are excluded from the
CBI, in particular, garments, textiles, and leather goods.'" Exports
from the United States to the CBI region have grown rapidly since
1987.'"
(ii) The CARIBCAN is a one-way free trade entry for goods into
Canada from the Caribbean countries of Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat,
St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and
Trinidad and Tobago.!" Exports which CARIBCAN covers from
CARICOM to Canada have not increased significantly, the range of
goods included remains limited, and the number of Caribbean firms
exporting to the Canadian market is very small.'
(iii) The Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), signed in December

1991 by President Bush, provides duty-free status for $324 million in
exports from the Andean countries."
(iv) The Venezuela-CARICOM agreement, signed in July 1991, offers
duty-free treatment to imports from the Caribbean countries.' Under
the Venezuelan initiative, tariffs on imports from CARICOM will be
phased out over a five-year period.' After five years, negotiations will

dent, US1TC Pub. 2431, 6th Rep., at 1-1 (1990).
128. Id at 1-2.
129. I& at vi. In 1990, the United States trade surplus with the Caribbean
Basin countries totaled $1.8 billion. Id.
130. Canada and The Commonwealth Caribbean: Evaluation of the
CARIBCAN Experience Since 1986, Report of the 18th Meeting of the Latin American
Council of the Latin American Economic System, Sept. 7-11, 1992, at 3-4, Doc. No.
SPICLXVMI No. 20 (1992). Article II of the 1979 Trade and Economic Cooperation
Agreement provides that all member nations are "to apply to goods originating in
each other's territories the highest degree of liberalization .. . ." Id. at 3. However,
Article V of the agreement also states that "Any Member State which . . . enters
into a preferential agreement with any developing Country is not required under this
Agreement to extend similar or comparable treatment to Canada . . . ." rd. at 3-4.
131. Id at 13-14.
132. Approval of Andean Trade Preference Act Will Create Opportunitiesfor
U.S. Business; Duty Free Treatment to Imports of Eligible Articles from Columbia,
Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador, Business America, Information Access Co., Jan. 13, 1992,
available in LEXIS, World Library, AIIWId File.
Caribbean: Trade Pact With Venezuela at Summit a Step Towards
133.
"Widening" CAR1COM, Reuter Textine, July, 25, 1991, available in LEXIS, World
Library, AIIWld File.
134. Id
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begin for reciprocal tariff concessions by the Caribbean countries on
Venezuelan products."5
3.

Bilateral Agreements

There are also numerous bilateral agreements involving virtually every
pair of countries within the hemisphere, thus serving to complicate trade.
The United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement went into effect in
1980. This was the first arrangement between developed countries in the
hemisphere. It is also important because it went beyond the provisions
of the GATT and, therefore, represented a significant increase in trade
liberalization."

Columbia and Venezuela signed an agreement in January 1992 which
will eventually phase out tariffs and other barriers in two-way trade.' 7
The two nations are members of the Andean bloc which is developing a
free trade zone that will include Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru.' A common market is planned by 1995.139 Peru and Bolivia signed a free
trade agreement in November 1992 providing for duty-free bilateral trade
of 6,000 products.'" Chile has signed bilateral trade agreements with
Argentina, Brazil, Columbia, Mexico and Venezuela."' Under the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, the United States has signed bilateral
trade and investment agreements with Columbia in July 1990; Canada in
July 1990; Chile in October 1990; Honduras in November 1990; Costa
Rica in November 1990; Venezuela in April 1991; El Salvador in May
1991; Peru in May 1991; the South American Common Market
(MERCOSUR), Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay in June 1991;
Nicaragua in June, 1991; Panama in June 1991; and CARICOM, the
Bahamas, Antigua, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica,
Monsteratt, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Trinidad, and Tobago

135.
136.

Id.
See generally, The Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement: The

Global Impact (Jeffrey J.Schott & Murray G. Smith eds., 1988) (presenting a collection of essays discussing the provisions of the United States-Canada Free Trade
Agreement).
137. Yoshihiro Hirata, President Perez s National Belt-Tightening Helps Stabilize Economy, Nikkei Weekly, July, 27, 1991, available in LEXIS, World Library,
AIIWid File.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140.

CECON TRADE NEWs, Vol. XVII, No. 12, Dec. 1992, at 6.
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in July 1991." Mexico and Bolivia signed before the announcement of
the EAt1. These arrangements represent preparatory steps for a free
trade agreement and establish the institutional mechanism for a bilateral
trade and investment council for negotiating a free trade agreement
between the United States and other countries or groups of countries.

B. PROPOSED AND FORTHCOMING TRADE AGREEMENTS IN THE
WESTERN HEMISPHERE

In addition to the existing trade agreements there are a number of
important forthcoming trade agreements, the most important of which is
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), involving Canada,
Mexico, and the United States.
1. The North American Free Trade Agreement
The United States economy is suffering from a persistent trade deficit
and a growing perception that protectionism and unfair trade practices
by Japan and other trading partners are to blame.'" The further integration of the EEC in 1992 and its collective intransigence in the GATE
negotiations, particularly over agricultural subsidies, has been interpreted
by the United States government as protectionism for the sake of maintaining a trade bloc. The difficulties experienced in expanding exports to
the newly industrialized countries of Asia compounded the feeling of
being embattled against a world of protectionist trade blocs. It is in this
context that in 1987 the United States and Canada concluded a free

142.

See U.S. Signs Trade-Inesment Pact With the Four MERCOSUR Na-

tions; Southern Cone Common Market Nations: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguayand Uruguay, Business America, Information Access Company, July 1, 1991, available in
LEXIS, World Library, AIWId File (discussing the signing and proposed signing of
various framework agreements).
143. Id
144. See Japan: Uncertainty Clouds U.S.-Japan Trade Relationship, Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 154-56 (Jan. 27, 1993) (stating that Japan will be a

likely target under Super 301 provisions of the 1988 Trade Act which requires the
United States Trade Representative to report to Congress regarding countries whose
borders are closed to United States exports, and investigate their use of unfair trade
practices). The trade deficit with Japan is larger than any of the trade deficits the
United States currently has with other countries. Id In the first ten months of 1992,
the United States trade deficit with Japan totaled $88.4 billion. rd See also Jagdish
Bhagwati, Aggressive Unilateralism: An Overview, in Aggressive Unilateralism 3-5
(Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh Patrick eds., 1992) (outlining the provisions of Super
301).

708

AM. UJ.INT'L L & POL'Y

[VOL. 8:683

trade agreement, and in June 1990 Mexico and the United States announced their intention to negotiate a comprehensive bilateral trade
agreement which was later expanded into the trilateral North American
Free Trade Agreement by the inclusion of Canada.'45 In 1990, President George Bush announced the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative,
with the objective of creating a hemispheric free trade area commencing
with NAFTA."
The EAI consists of three components. First, trade liberalization is to
be encouraged with the aim of creating a western hemispheric free trade
agreement by virtue of the execution of a series of smaller free trade
agreements. 47 This effort begins with the implementation of NAFTA.
Succeeding agreements will depend on the readiness of the individual
countries.
Second, the EAI seeks to promote private investment flows according
to two strategies. First, an investment sector loan program is to be created within the Inter-American Development Bank to provide resources to
support privatization efforts, as well as to create an environment which
promotes increased entrepreneurship. Additionally, a Multi-lateral Investment Fund of $1.3 billion will be disbursed between 1992 and
1996. " This fund will furnish financial and technical assistance to
support privatization, private enterprise development, and the improvement of general business infrastructures.' 49
Third, the EAI will strive to reduce the total stock of external debt
by reducing debt owed to the United States.' This plan requires that
145.

Jonathan Confino, Canada, Mexico and US Form $4 Trillion Trade

Bloc, Daily Tele., Dec. 16, 1992, at 16 (reporting that Canada, Mexico, and the United States are to sign the North American Free Trade Agreement on December .17,

1992).
146. U.S. Signs Trade-Investment Pact With the Four MERCOSUR Nations;
Southern Cone Common Market Nations: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay,
Business America, Information Access Company, July 1, 1991, available in LEXIS,
World Library, AlIWld File.

147. U.S. Signs Trade-Investment Pact With the Four MERCOSUR Nations;
Southern Cone Common Market Nations: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay,
Business America, Information Access Company, July 1, 1991, available in LEXIS,
World Library, AIlWld File.

148.

Enrique V. Iglesias, The New Latin America and the Inter-American De-

velopment Bank, Wash. Q., Winter 1993, at 115, 123.
149. Id

150.

See Bush Transmits Legislative Proposal to Implement Latin American

Reform Package, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 349-50 (March 6, 1991) (discussing United States proposals to facilitate Latin American debt reduction and general
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concessional and PL480 "food for peace" debt will be reduced as the
general stock of debt is reduced, and interest on the remaining portion
will be payable in local currency. Interest payments will be applied to
fund environmental projects. Also, the debt owed to the Export-Import
Bank or to the Commodity Credit Corporation will be reduced through
the sale of debt on the secondary market."
In keeping with the goals of the EAI, in May 1992, President Bush
indicated that a free trade agreement with Chile will follow the completion of NAFTA.' The United States regards Chile as the country
which is most ready and capable of either joining NAFTA or having a
fre trade agreement with the United States. " The Chilean government
has also signaled that it is ready, willing, and able to consummate such
an agreement's Recognizing that trade on a completely reciprocal basis cannot be achieved within a short time-frame, the United States has
repeatedly acknowledged that the process of creating a hemispheric free
trade area is one which requires at least a decade to complete.

economic reform). Currently, Caribbean and Latin American countries owe over $5.5
billion to the United States. Department of Commerce Market Report on the Western
Hemisphere: The Enterprise for the Americas, National Trade Data Bank, Jan. 15,
1993, available in LEXIS, World library, AIIWld file.
151. Department of Commerce Market Report on the Western Hemisphere:
The Enterprisefor the Americas, National Trade Data Bank, Jan. 15, 1993, available
in LEXIS, World Library, AlIWId File. Latin American and Caribbean countries currently owe $4 billion to the Export-Import Bank, and $1.5 billion to the Commodity
Credit Corporation. Id
152. Michael G.- Wilson, A U.S. Chile Free Trade Agreement: Igniting Economic Prospiriry in the Americas, Backgrounder (The Heritage Foundation), July 31,
1992, at 1.
153.
See id at 3 (stating that, as a result of the economic reforms in Chile
which include the elimination of price controls, tariff reductions, and increased privatization efforts, it is an ideal candidate for a free trade agreement with the United

States).
154. See Chile is Only Latin American Ready to Negotiate FTA, U.S. Oficial Says, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 946 (May 28, 1992). See also, Andrea
Butelmann & Alicia Frohmann, U.S.-Chile Free Trade, in The Premise and the
Promise: Free Trade in the Americas 179-94 (Sylvia Saborio et al. eds., 1992) (discussing the issues raised by the United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement).
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ISSUES FOR FURTHER EFFORTS TOWARD
HEMISPHERIC TRADE INTEGRATION
A.

READINESS FOR FREE TRADE

Attempting to move the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean toward free trade, challenges the historical basis and structure upon
which production and trade have been conducted in the past. Such a
profound adjustment involves two aspects: (1) liberalization of the trade
regime governing imports, and (2) internal economic reform and structural adjustment to create a genuine market economy. This process has
been evolving since the late 1970s in several countries throughout the
region. These countries have implemented a series of International Monetary Fund (IMF) stabilization programs and World Bank adjustment
programs directed toward increasing growth, reducing the balance of
payments deficit, and controlling inflation. The liberalization of trade
regimes has varied throughout the region but is already well advanced in
Chile, Jamaica, and Costa Rica.' 5 However, the impending North
American Free Trade Agreement confronts the region with a need to
accelerate the completion of the adjustment process in preparation for
competition in the global marketplace.
If accession to NAFTA is available, the question becomes whether
Latin American and Caribbean economies can meet the eligibility criteria
in the foreseeable future. To be considered an acceptable partner for
negotiation of a free trade agreement with the United States, the following criteria have been suggested:' 6 (1) the elimination of tariffs on
substantially all trade between the parties to the agreement; (2) providing for the phase-out of non-tariff barriers; (3) the inclusion of services
in the agreement; (4) setting standards for the treatment of investment
by which there will be no inclusion of "trade-distorting performance requirements" on the part of investors; (5) the inclusion of a dispute settlement mechanism; (6) assurances of the protection of intellectual property rights; (7) the inclusion of special provisions, if necessary, to handle trade in, and access to, natural resources and natural resource-based
products; (8) the inclusion of a variety of operational, technical and
security provisions such as rules of origin, as well as public health and

U.S. MARKET AccEss IN LATIN AMERICA: RECENT LIBERALIZATION
155.
MEASURES AND REMAINING BARRIMRS (1992).
156.
ENTERPRISE FOR THE AMERICAS INITIATIVE ACT OF 1991, H.R. 964,

102d Cong., 1st Sess., Feb. 19, 1991.
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safety exceptions and safeguards; (9) the monitoring of government
actions that could undermine the basis of the agreement, such as provisions covering subsidies, state trading, and the use of foreign exchange
restrictions and controls; (10) a stable macro-economic environment and
market oriented policies as certified by the IMF, World Bank and
Inter-American Development Bank; and (11) a commitment to a
multi-lateral trading system assessed by the extent to which the trading
nation's positions concur with those of the United States in the GATr.
Whether the Latin American and Caribbean economies are able to
take advantage of access to the larger hemispheric market to expand
exports depends, not only on government policies, but also on the readiness and ability of the private sector to compete effectively. Even where
a comparative advantage exists in these economies, it could ultimately
be offset by a lack of a competitive advantage by locally owned firms.
The expansion of exports will depend on a combination of both comparative and competitive advantages.
The state of preparedness also varies considerably, reflecting economic and psychological factors. In the larger, more advanced economies
some firms and financial institutions have become multinationals or are
branching into the United States and Europe. In fact, it is the outgrowth
of the national market and the process of corporate integration which,
like in the EEC, is driving the resurgence of regional trade liberalization. In the small economies the private sector firms are economic minutiae, family owned and managed, and almost wholly and profitably
confined to commerce and not production. Even a trans-national
merger-movement would not make them viable. There is, however, no
reason why they cannot be worthwhile joint-venture partners with foreign investors. Apart from infrastructure, all other inputs, including technology, can be purchased. The difficulties are not insurmountable, but
there must be both a recognition and a willingness to integrate. This,
like every process of adjustment, begins with a change of mind, outlook,
and attitude.
B. PARTICIPATION: IF, WHEN, AND How?
The question which immediately confronts the Latin American and
Caribbean countries is whether they want to move quickly towards free
trade by participating in NAFTA, or whether they will continue to pursue regional trade arrangements. The answer requires a detailed process
of weighing the costs and benefits of membership in a hemispheric
trading bloc. This will be an especially difficult question for the
micro-states of the Caribbean that will require a much more extended
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adjustment period than the more developed economies of the region.
A World Bank study has estimated that if all United States trade
barriers (tariff and non-tariff) were eliminated, exports from Latin America would increase by approximately 8%."' The impact varies from
14% export growth in Brazil to 3% in Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Peru and
Venezuela.' 3 The World Bank has calculated that a 50% reduction in
tariffs and non-tariff barriers in the multinational trading system would
allow Latin America to increase its exports by 19% or nearly $10 billion per year."9 Economic benefits would undoubtedly be derived from
regional integration and regional trade arrangements if implementation is
consistent and meaningfully pursued. Bearing this in mind, it must be
noted that intra-regional agreements have not made a significant contribution to intra-regional trade in Latin America during the last 30 years.
Intra-regional exports as a share of total exports increased in both the
ACA and in LAFTA and LAIA between 1960 and 1980, but by 1990
was below the 1980 level."W Ironically, the area of the world economy
which has consistently experienced the highest rates of growth in trade
is Asia,"' but this has occurred in the absence of regional trade arrangements.
C. Tm PATHS TO HEMISPHERIC FREE TRADE
There are two major directions in which regional trade arrangements
can be converted into a hemispheric free trade area. First, there could be
an organized process of rationalization and simplification of the existing
regional arrangements starting from an agreed core of trade liberalization
measures. Politically, this would be extremely difficult to organize and
would require some regional organization such as the Organization of
American States (OAS) to be responsible for orchestrating this process.
By the second direction, it is likely that NAFTA, by virtue of its size
and membership consisting of the most industrialized countries in the
hemisphere, will constitute the foundation upon which the architecture of

157.
Refik Erzan & Alexander Yeats, Free Trade Agreements with the
United States, World Bank Working Papers on Int'l Trade (WPS 827) Jan. 1992, at
36.
158. Id. at 36-39.
159.
GLOBAL ECONOMIC PRospEcrs AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (The
World Bank), Apr. 1992, at 22-25.
160. Augusto de ]a Torre & Margaret R. Kelley, Regional Trade Arrangements, IMF Occasional Paper, Mar. 1992, at 30.
161.
Id at 1.
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hemispheric free trade can be constructed. Latin America currently relies
heavily on the markets now available in the NAFTA nations. Latin
American and Caribbean exports to the western hemisphere account for
57% of total exports in the hemisphere." Much of this trade activity,
however, is with the United States which absorbs 40% of the region's
total exports.1 63
Pursuing this second direction, there are two ways to expand NAFTA
into a hemispheric free trade area.'" On one hand, NAFTA could be
expanded by an accession clause with a sequence of countries entering
at a later date.'" It is feared that securing a free trade agreement with
NAFTA is going to be difficult because the "Big Three" (Europe, North
America, and Japan) may lose interest in further expansion, or want to
wait for a period in order to evaluate NAFTA's progress." Moreover,
expansion may face political obstacles as existing United States trade
law prevents the extension of free trade agreement benefits to third
countries.' Thus, it will be necessary to renew fast track authority for
each agreement subsequent to NAFTA."3 The concern with such a
strategy is that the time lag between the entry of each individual country could have serious dislocation effects throughout the hemisphere. For
example, investment diversion is a serious danger because Mexico already has certain competitive advantages such as lower transportation
costs, lower wages, cheaper energy resources, and a market size that can
yield economies of scale that other countries would find difficult to
realize. This would create an uneven playing field when, in fact, trade
162.

Peter Hakim, Western Hemisphere Free Trade: Why Should Latin

America be Interested, 526 Annals Am. Academy, 121, 127 (1993).
163.

Id

164. See Gary C. Hufbauer & Jeffrey . Schott, North American Free Trade:
Issues and Recommendations 39-41 (1992) [hereinafter HUFBAUER & SCHOTr] (evaluating various methods of expanding NAFIA, including, implementation of an accession clause, creation of free trade agreements between NAFrA countries and other
hemispheric- nations, and use of a consultation clause by which the United States
would have to consult with Canada and Mexico before signing any new trade
agreements).
165. Id at 40-41.
166. Ambassador Carla A. Hills, Trade, the Americas, and the Worl4 Address Before the Organization of American Stares Conference of Trade Ministers (Oct.
29, 1991).
167. HUFBAUER & SCHOTr, supra note 164, at 41.
168. See HuFBAuER & SCHOTC, supra note 164, at 41 (recommending that
NAFrA should include a provision by which the United States President would have
to seek congressional approval of the accession of any additional country to NAFrA).
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liberalization should produce a level playing field with clear
non-discriminatory rules. Thus, the procedures and timetable for expanding NAFrA beyond its current membership should be clearly set out.
This process should be transparent and based on clearly defmed criteria
for eligibility."
On the other hand, a "hub and spoke" pattern of free trade agreements could develop with the United State and possibly Mexico as the
core. 0 There is already a hub and spoke developing around Mexico as
various countries jockey to get through the "back door" of NAFTA via
bilateral arrangements with Mexico."' Such a proliferation of tangential
agreements is detrimental to the objective of trade liberalization as it
creates confusion and uncertainty.

D. ACCOMMODATING DIFFERENT LEVELS OF DEVELOPMENT
How is the treatment of different levels of economic development to
be accommodated within the free trade arrangements? Indeed, are they
going to be accommodated? The problem and principle of differential
treatment,1 72 was one of the most contentious issues in negotiating the
framework agreements" even though they are non-binding, committing
the signatories only to further dialogue. This issue was resolved in the

169. See HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 164, at 41 (critiquing the accession clause strategy).
170. See HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 164, at 24, 34 (describing the
"hub and spoke" approach whereby two alternatives exist for prospective free trade
partners: join the core provisions of NAFTA, or enter into separate free trade agreements with the members of NAFIA).
171.
See Damian Fraser, Mexico Links With New Trade Zone: A Framework
Pact for Central America, Fin. Times, Aug. 26, 1992, at 5 (reporting on the signing
of an agreement between Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and
Costa Rica which provides guidelines for the future creation of bilateral trade agreements between the participating nations).
172. See Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, Differential and More Favorable Treatment:
The GATT Enabling Clause, 14 L World Trade L. 488, 488-507 (1980) (explaining
that "the principal of differential treatment is based on the idea that equal treatment
of unequals is unjust and that the same rules can therefore not apply to countries at
different stages of development").
173.
See U.S. Signs Trade-Investment Pact With the Four MERCOSUR Nations; Southern Cone Common Market Nations: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Untguay, Business America, Information Access Company, July 1, 1991, available in
LEXIS, World Library, AIlWId File (reporting on the signing of recent framework
agreements which are bilateral trade agreements created to complement the efforts of
the EA in creating a free trade zone stretching from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego).
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case of the United States-CARICOM Framework Agreement by the term
"undiversified economies" which tried to grapple with the fact that because of the very narrow range of production and exports, Caribbean
economies have a structural vulnerability to external events and are in
urgent need of structural adjustment. The United States was not prepared
to accommodate any reference to different levels of development, placing the entire agreement in jeopardy. The United States continues to
maintain that there can be no accommodation of different levels of
development in a "mature relationship." However, some flexibility will
be necessary, at least in the initial stages, since any regional arrangement aimed at integration and trade liberalization must accommodate
development heterogeneity. This includes different levels of development, coexistence of a variety of growth strategies, and structural adjustment at varying stages of completion.
The inclusion of special and differential treatment for less-developed
member countries in regional trade arrangements is consistent with the
GATT in which the principle of "differential and more favorable treatment for developing countries" is explicitly recognized.' Article 36
acknowledges the special characteristics and importance of trade with
developing countries, and the need to promote growth and diversification.'75 However, in Article 37, the developed countries are only committed to implement Article 36 to the fullest extent possible and to
accord high priority.
E.

ASymmTRCAL RECIPROCITY

Reciprocity can have a range of connotations which cannot be reduced to equivalence but can constitute modified or conditional "most
favored nation" treatment. Asymmetrical adjustment is one way to recognize and compensate for differences in the levels of development.
Because the notion of differential treatment is deeply entrenched in the
smaller, less developed countries which receive longer adjustment per-

174. See Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, Differential and More Favorable Treatment:
The GAIT Enabling Clause, 14 J. World Trade L. 488, 488 (1980) (quoting the Enabling Clause of the GAIT which was constructed during the Tokyo Round Multilateral Trade negotiations).

175. See Kenneth W. Dam, The GATT: Law and the International Economic
Organization 443-446 (1970) (discussing paragraph 8 of Article 36 which states: "The
developed contracting parties (countries) do not expect reciprocity for commitments

made by them in trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriems to
the trade of less developed contracting parties").
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ods, it will be difficult to purge these countries of this tenet of their
development philosophy. However, there can be little opposition to the
concept of phasing out differences in obligations over a long period,
perhaps twenty years. Clearly, it would be difficult at the outset of a
free trade agreement to accept special and differential treatment in perpetuity. Thus, specific criteria for graduation to nondiscriminatory status
with mutuality of concessions is necessary. 7 ' The United States has
both espoused "graduation" and practiced it by disqualifying certain
advanced developing countries from the Generalized System of Preferencesrn
Should reciprocity be complete, asymmetrical, partial, or "relative,"
and should it commence immediately or be phased in over a period of
years? The Caribbean's apprehension over immediate and complete
reciprocity derives less from the inability to undertake policy measures
and institutional changes than from the social and economic costs of
structural adjustment. This is a valid concern because, in these economies, structural adjustment implies both resource allocation from extinct
to emerging sectors, and resource creation for the installment of new or
upgraded productive capacity. There are risks and difficulties involved in
improving quality, quantity and price in order to survive and compete in
a vast hemispheric market with a range of competitors, including giant
multi-national corporations with assets that dwarf the GDP of the combined Caribbean countries. Although daunting, these changes can be
accomplished as the fragmentation of the production process into smaller
discrete processes provides opportunities and specialized niches in the
international division of labor which can be filled by relatively small
scale operations.
F. PROLIFERATION AND CONFUSION
The regional trade agreements seek to liberalize and facilitate trade.
However, the proliferation of agreements is making it more complex as
exporters and importers can never be sure which regime governs their
operations. Superimposing several agreements may well result in a be-

176. See Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, Differential and More Favorable Treatnent:
The GA7T Enabling Clause, 14 J. World Trade L. 488, 503 (1980) (explaining that
the concept of "graduation" is shunned by developed countries because there is no
objective standard for measuring the different treatment to be accorded underdeveloped
nations).
177.
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wildering array of different tariff levels on the same products, and tariff
reductions might be stopped or delayed by the requirements of the different kinds of arrangements. Thus, the overlapping of agreements is
hindering trade rather than promoting it. Simplification, which could

come from a single hemispheric free trade area, is needed.
G.

REGIONALISM AS A PREPARATORY STEP

It is frequently claimed that regional trade liberalization schemes are a
preparatory stage to competing in the world market. This, however, may
be a misconception. The misconception partly exists in the case of regional integration among small economies all of which produce the
same products and where most of their major exports are to
extra-regional markets. In this situation, regional integration does not
improve efficiency because the market is not enlarged sufficiently to
yield economies of scale, and the major exports will be unaffected by
this integration. Integrating the Caribbean is not going to increase exports of apparel exports, bauxite, oil, banana, coffee, and tourism which
are the main exports.
The second misconception is that there can be a deepening within
regional integration and that this would be preparatory. There are wide
disparities within regional groups with respect to policy direction and
preparedness to compete. Regional integration moves at the pace of the
slowest economy, and some of the economies have not even accepted
the notion that adjustment is inevitable.
A third misconception is that disparities in size and levels of development can be addressed simply by extending the period of adjustment
or by excluding certain products and sectors and, therefore, protecting
them. None of these measures would really help the countries as a
group or individually to ever get to the stage of being efficient or competitive.

CONCLUSION
Free trade theoretically constitutes the most beneficial situation. In the
real world, however, conditions prevent the realization of this optimism.
Hence, reality compels a resort to second best solutions, one of which is
regional integration. Pursuit of this option was encouraged by the protectionism in industrialized countries which constrained industrialization
and trade in Latin America and the Caribbean. Regional integration in
the 1950s and 1960s was viewed as a means to spur growth and industrialization through increased trade induced by liberalization, the stimulus
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of competition, and the economies of scale generated by larger markets.
The experience of the 1960s produced an increase in intra-regional trade.
This momentum dissipated in the 1970s and 1980s due to external
shocks, economic crisis, and political instability. In the late 1980s, there
was a resurgence of interest in regional trade arrangements and regional
integration.
Regional trade arrangements are compatible with an open, liberalized,
multilateral trading system. Indeed, regionalism could provide the impetus to completing the Uruguay Round of the GAIT. Regional initiatives
must resolve a number of fundamental issues if they are to come to
fruition. The keys to resolving these issues are a vision and political
commitment for cooperation and coordination, and a sustained pursuit of
economic reform, structural adjustment and trade liberalization. Many
countries are implementing adjustment programs and some are well
advanced. Domestic reforms must be complemented by improved export
market access, regionally and globally.
In today's highly interdependent economy of the Americas, it is less
and less meaningful to view adjustment as a purely national phenomenon. Indeed, adjustment is a transnational phenomenon because of the
globalization of production, investment, and finance. Regional trade
arrangements could be an important mechanism for adjustment to become transnational.

